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This article surveys the literature on the relationship between corporate income taxation and inequal-
ity through the lens of the recent book The triumph of injustice— How the rich dodge taxes and how to 
make them pay by Saez and Zucman (2019). First, we analyze the nexus between corporate taxation and 
inequality by reviewing both studies that highlight the curbing effect of corporate tax on inequality, and 
by examining studies claiming that more corporate taxation might paradoxically raise personal inequal-
ity. Then we proceed by identifying current practices in taxing multinational entities, and provide an 
overview of the latest estimates on nations’ missing fiscal revenues. Finally, we discuss the policy pro-
posals put forward by Saez and Zucman (2019) to reform corporate taxation at the global level through 
the introduction of a global corporate minimum tax.
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1. inTRoducTion
This review article surveys the economics literature on the relationship between 
corporate income taxation and its effects on inequality through the lens of the 
recently published book The triumph of injustice— How the rich dodge taxes and 
how to make them pay by Saez and Zucman (2019). First, we recall one of the main 
theses of Saez and Zucman (2019): the overall degree of progressivity of the US 
tax system has declined steadily over the last decades due to, among other factors, 
a diminished effort to tax corporate profits and, more generally, income from cap-
ital.1 The authors’ claim is graphically supported by plotting the average tax rates 
1In a recent book review of The triumph of justice…, Wolff  (2020) highlights how the topic of re-
distribution in government intervention in the US should instead be analyzed by also examining the 
government expenditure side (the so- called benefit principle), rather than only focusing on the tax side 
as done in Saez and Zucman (2019) where the more traditional ability- to- pay principle is applied.
☆We are grateful for valuable comments from the book review editor Thesia I. Garner, and from 
numerous colleagues at our home institutions. All errors remain our own.
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by income group in 2018 (including individual income, property, corporate, con-
sumption and payroll taxes), showing that the tax rate for the richest 400 individu-
als turns out to be lower than that levied on the working, middle, and upper- middle 
classes in 2018.
How can we qualify this claim? For the sake of comparison, we put the 
authors’ estimation on the US tax system in perspective by showing, in Figure 1, 
our estimates of the average tax rates by income groups in Norway for both 1993 
(solid line) and 2015 (dashed line). Notice that we only take into consideration 
individual income taxes, wealth taxes, and social contributions paid by employees 
here, hence abstracting from payroll and indirect consumption taxes which would 
make the curve flatter in Norway as well. Figure 1 highlights that the US tax sys-
tem implies higher average tax rates for the bottom 90 percent than the Norwegian 
system, while it allows the top 10 percent to pay a lower share of income that they 
would have in Norway. Overall, and without employing more sophisticated mea-
sures (for a classical survey on measures of progressivity, see Lambert, 1985 or 
Kakwani, 1977), the rather low degree of progressivity of the US tax system 
appears indisputable.2
What lies behind the evidence of low progressivity of the US tax system? Saez 
and Zucman (2019) point to the slow agony of the corporate income tax. In the 
US, the statutory tax rate on corporate profits was between 48 percent and 52 
percent from 1951 to 1978, with corporate tax liabilities representing the largest 
fraction of taxes that the top 0.1 percent of income earners were paying to tax 
authorities (Figure 2.3 on page 43 of Saez and Zucman, 2019). Since the early 
1980s, the decline in the marginal tax rates on corporate income determined a par-
adigm shift: federal tax revenues from corporate income tax started to depart from 
2See Tarroux (2019) for survey experiments that investigate how people value tax progressivity.
Figure 1. Average tax rates by income groups, US (left) vs Norway (right). Note: The above figures 
present a comparison of the average tax rates by income groups for the US and Norway. On the left, 
we plot the average tax rates by income group in the US in 2018 as presented in Saez and Zucman 
(2019), Figure 1.2 page 15, including individual income, property, corporate, consumption and payroll 
taxes. On the right, we compute the average tax rates by income group (considering total personal 
income) in Norway for two separate years, 1993 and 2015. Administrative data on total personal 
income (including pensions and transfers) and taxes (including individual income taxes, wealth taxes 
and social contributions paid to municipalities, regions and the state) are retrieved from microdata.no, 
an online portal administered by Statistics Norway.
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the increasing revenues deriving from individual income tax, as shown in Figure 2 
borrowed from Saez and Zucman (2019).
Departing from the above context that highlights the role of corporate income 
taxation for the progressivity of the tax system, in section 2 we review the inequal-
ity effects of the corporate income tax. Section 3 investigates the current practices 
of corporate income taxation for multinational entities, including the ongoing 
debate regarding alternative international tax architectures. Section 4 presents the 
proposals for reforming corporate and personal taxation put forward in Saez and 
Zucman (2019).
2. inequaliTy eFFecTs oF coRpoRaTe TaxaTion
In this section, we briefly survey the literature explaining the multifaceted and 
complex relationship between corporate income taxation and personal inequality. 
For the literature devoted instead to the relationship between capital taxation and 
inequality, refer to the survey by Bastani and Waldenström (2020). Since corpora-
tions’ shareholders tend to overlap with individuals in the upper end of the income 
and wealth distributions, taxing corporations can be, at first sight, considered a 
handy tool to curb the degree of personal inequality. In fact, corporate tax changes 
might directly compress the distribution of post- tax disposable income, especially 
at the very top. Along these lines, Nallareddy et al. (2018) attempt to directly esti-
mate the causal effect of US states’ corporate tax cuts on top income inequality. 
By exploiting state- level inequality data, the authors find that that a 1 percent cut 
in corporate taxes raises the share of income accruing to the top 1 percent by 0.9. 
Regarding the mechanism behind this causal evidence, the authors suggest that this 
result is largely due to top earners shifting income from labor to capital income 
in response to corporate tax cuts in order to reduce their overall tax liabilities. 
This result highlights that corporate taxation qualifies as a necessary element for 
a coherent tax system since its presence makes it less attractive to shift income 
Figure 2. The slow agony of US federal revenues from corporate taxation. Note: Figure 4.1 page 70 in 
Saez and Zucman (2019), showing federal corporate and individual income tax revenue, percentage of 
national income.
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from the personal tax base to the corporate tax base (Bastani and Waldenström, 
2020). Graham (1936) is, to the best of our knowledge, among the first studies to 
investigate in depth the functioning of the undistributed profits tax. He highlights 
that such a tax would induce corporations to distribute a higher share of retained 
earnings to shareholders, which will then be subject to progressive personal income 
taxation. Graham (1936) adds (page 10) that “the Undistributed Profits Tax will 
lead to undistributed cash disbursements by companies [...], and to the issuance 
of additional stock generally to represent reinvested earnings. As far as those 
particular effects are concerned, we consider them favorable to the stockholders 
and not inimical to the financial soundness of corporations.” Hager and Baines 
(2020) highlight how a gradual reduction in corporate taxation in the US has led 
to increasing power for large corporations in the corporate sector, causing stronger 
corporate concentration. By their nature, large corporations tend to focus more on 
shareholder value enhancements that directly benefit the asset- rich, rather than on 
productivity- enhancing investments that could benefit working- class employees, 
resulting in wider household inequality.
Caution is, however, recommended due to the indirect behavioral effects of 
corporate taxation. Corporate taxation influences the demand for capital and 
labor and ultimately the return to capital, hence the general effects on inequal-
ity are not straightforward and require investigating the economic incidence of 
taxes. Following Musgrave and Musgrave (1984), the process of shifting the tax 
burden might lead to a final distribution of income substantially different from 
that hypothesized by simply looking at statutory incidence. Higher corporate taxes 
might lower demand for capital and hence reduce the capital stock, increasing 
its return and thereby widening the income distribution. Higher corporate taxes 
might also result in higher prices from manufacturing corporations, hence shift-
ing the burden to consumers (Ablett and Hart, 2005). Arulampalam et al. (2012) 
and Fuest et al. (2018) analyze the extent to which taxes on corporate income are 
passed on to wages, and find that workers bear about one- half  of the total tax bur-
den. Clausing (2013)’s review of the empirical work in this specific area shows that 
the empirical evidence of adverse effects on labor contains several pitfalls related 
to the robustness of results. For a recent analysis on the incidence of US states’ 
corporate taxes on the welfare of workers, landowners, and firm owners, see Suárez 
Serrato and Zidar (2016).
There are also studies pointing out that more corporate taxation might par-
adoxically raise personal inequality. Hines (2020) claims that a collateral effect 
of taxing corporations might be that owners relocate their firms abroad or into 
the non- corporate sector, with the latter exhibiting a higher dispersion of capi-
tal income than in the corporate universe. In other words, Hines (2020) builds on 
Harberger (1962) to claim that the main effect of an increase in the corporate tax 
is rather to shrink the corporate sector, leading several business owners to shift to 
the non- corporate sector, a sort of reallocation effect. An increasing share of non- 
corporate businesses in the economy raises the level of idiosyncratic risk (due to 
less diversification), thereby widening the distribution of income.
Review of Income and Wealth, Series 0, Number 0, Month 2021
5
© 2021 The Authors. Review of Income and Wealth published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf  of 
International Association for Research in Income and Wealth
3. coRpoRaTe TaxaTion and mulTinaTionals
To understand the linkage between corporate taxation and inequality in a 
deeper way, current corporate taxation practices and strategies by multinationals 
are next de- scribed. Corporate taxation is a key component of the fiscal system of 
both developed and developing countries.3 Its main role is to act as a backstop to 
personal income taxation, a sort of withholding device for the personal income 
tax. The corporate income tax also ensures that foreign owners of domestic corpo-
rations pay taxes in the host country. However, the ability of sovereign jurisdictions 
to raise revenue through corporation taxes is limited by the current international 
tax rules based on the separate entity and arm’s length principle. Such rules facili-
tate tax avoidance by multinational enterprises through the shifting of profits 
abroad. This, in turn, reduces the local corporate tax base (Huizinga and Laeven, 
2008). For tax purposes, under the arm’s length principle, a multinational corpo-
rate group should price transactions with its related entities (i.e., those that are 
ultimately owned by the same shareholders) as if  those transactions had occurred 
with unrelated entities.
Multinationals are required to identify market- based prices for the transfer of 
goods and services within the multinational in order to obtain a price that approx-
imates the result that independent entities would reach in the market. There are 
numerous ways to determine the arm’s length price, and the flexibility embedded 
in these rules allows firms to choose transfer pricing methodologies that support 
the use of internal prices, shifting profits from high- to low- tax countries. Transfer 
prices are, therefore, likely influenced by the tax- minimization strategies of mul-
tinational firms. Also there is a strong and statistically significant relationship 
between countries’ tax rates and the prices of intrafirm transactions (Bartelsman 
and Beetsma, 2003; Clausing, 2003). Thus, multinationals can shift profits from 
high- to low- tax countries through intragroup financing (Faccio and FitzGerald, 
2018) and trade in goods and services (Bartelsman and Beetsma, 2003; Cristea and 
Nguyen, 2016; Wier, 2020), thereby reducing the corporate tax base.
The rise of intellectual property as a share of multinationals’ value, in addi-
tion to its high mobility, has enabled multinationals to locate their ownership in 
jurisdictions that provide preferential tax treatment and to structure intragroup 
transactions to shift profits arising from the exploitation of intellectual property to 
low- tax jurisdictions. Griffith et al. (2014) show that multinationals’ decisions over 
where to locate the legal ownership of their patents are affected by corporate tax 
rates and preferential tax treatment in relation to the exploitation of intellectual 
property. Overall, the current system creates incentives for multinational compa-
nies to manipulate the apparent location of profit towards low- tax jurisdictions 
(Auerbach et al., 2008).
Alternative international tax architectures to those described above are widely 
dis- cussed in the literature. These alternatives require treating multinationals as 
unitary businesses and replacing the separate entity principle. Under residence- 
based worldwide taxation (Peroni et al., 2009), the home country of a multinational 
3An overview of Corporate Tax Statistics from the OECD can be found here: https://www.oecd.
org/tax/tax- polic y/corpo rate- tax- stati stics - secon d- editi on.pdf.
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applies the domestic tax scheme directly on the consolidated worldwide profits of 
a corporate group (with full credit for foreign taxes paid). This approach would 
allow all profits to be taxed, as a minimum, at the rate of the home country of the 
multinational, regardless of intragroup transfer pricing.
Unitary solutions can also shift taxing rights to jurisdictions in which the 
purchaser is located. One such solution is the destination- based cash flow tax 
(DBCFT) (Auerbach, 2017; Auerbach et al., 2017; Auerbach and Devereux, 2018; 
Hebous et al., 2020); this is equivalent to a broad- based, single- rate VAT combined 
with a wage subsidy at the same rate. The DBCFT is considered to improve eco-
nomic efficiency by taxing corporate profits in a relatively immobile location (the 
location of final purchasers of goods and services), and to be robust against tax- 
avoidance structures. However, applying the DBCFT with a border tax adjustment 
(i.e., allowing the deduction of domestic but not foreign costs) would likely be 
regarded as trade distorting and hence would potentially conflict with WTO rules 
(Cui, 2017).
Under formulary apportionment, global profits of a multinational are consoli-
dated to generate a unitary base that is apportioned between jurisdictions through 
the use of a formula. Formulary apportionment currently exists at the subna-
tional level in the USA, Germany, Canada, and Switzerland. The unitary base is 
apportioned across states (or provinces or cantons) using different, agreed- upon 
formulas and weights. The choice of formula naturally has implications for the dis-
tribution of taxing rights between countries and revenue generation (Clausing and 
Lahav, 2011; Pethig and Wagener, 2007; Riedel, 2018; Shackelford and Slemrod, 
1998), but this system could also eliminate opportunities to shift profits to low- tax 
jurisdictions through intragroup transfer pricing.
The European Commission has proposed a “Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base” (CCCTB) for the EU,4 where a uniform common tax base is 
established across member states. This tax base is then apportioned across member 
states by three equally weighted factors: sales, tangible fixed assets, and labor (pay-
roll and numbers of employees). Worldwide formula apportionment has also been 
proposed, with the reallocation of global profits based on sales (Avi- Yonah and 
Clausing, 2011) or through the use of a more balanced formula5 (Picciotto, 2018).
A bridging solution combining elements of formula apportionment and the 
conventional arm’s length principle is residual profit allocation (Avi- Yonah et al., 
2009), under which routine profits are allocated to jurisdictions on the basis of the 
function or activity performed, while residual profits are allocated (to some degree, 
if  not wholly) on some formulaic basis.
To address the issue of tax avoidance of multinationals, in 2013, the G20 
called on the OECD to coordinate efforts to reform the international corporate tax 
system through the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) initiative (Dharmapala, 
2014). This political negotiation is ongoing within the G20- OECD Inclusive 
Framework,6 with an outcome expected by mid- 2021. The solutions currently 
4See Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB).
5See ICRICT— The Independent Commission for the Reform of International Corporate 
Taxation: A road- map to improve rules for taxing multinationals.
6See Base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS).
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being negotiated include, for the first time, the treatment of multinationals as uni-
tary businesses and the allocation of a portion of residual profit of in- scope busi-
nesses to market/user jurisdictions, as well as a global minimum tax that would 
provide jurisdictions with a right to “tax back” where other jurisdictions have not 
exercised their primary taxing rights.7
As pointed out above, corporate taxation reforms at the national level are 
hampered by profit shifting to foreign countries and loss of fiscal revenues. These 
in turn heavily limit the efficacy of re- distributional government policies and widen 
the post- tax distribution of income (Gravelle, 2009). How large is the phenomenon 
of tax avoidance through corporate profit shifting?
Exactly estimating the scale of corporate profit shifting and associated revenue 
losses is difficult due to the lack of available public data. No estimate is definitive, 
but all available estimates are indeed of practical value for policymakers. Cobham 
and Janský (2018) estimate a yearly global revenue loss of approximately USD 
500 billion. In a subsequent study, Janský and Palanský (2019) compare estimated 
corporate tax revenue losses for groups of countries (grouped by GDP and volume 
of tax revenues), concluding that there are almost no statistically significant dif-
ferences across country groups. Crivelli et al. (2016) estimate USD 600 billion of 
yearly global revenue losses, divided into USD 400 billion of losses in OECD coun-
tries (equivalent to 1 percent of GDP), and USD 200 billion in non- OECD coun-
tries (equivalent to 1.3 percent of GDP). Torslov et al. (2020) estimate that up to 40 
percent of US multinationals’ overseas profits are shifted to low- tax jurisdictions 
each year, leading to global revenue losses of USD 200 billion, in line with OECD’s 
estimates of global losses in between USD 100−240 billion (OECD, 2015).
Discrepancy in the estimates just noted can be attributed first to a missing 
agreed upon methodology regarding how to estimate tax avoidance by multina-
tionals, and second to the fact that public data are not yet available with respect to 
profits and taxes paid by multinationals in each of the countries in which they 
operate. However, progress has been made since the eruption of the financial crisis 
in 2007, as multinationals with a global turnover of above USD 750 million now 
have to annually report to their jurisdictions of residence via a country- by- country 
(CbC) report, which includes information on revenue, sales, profits before tax, and 
tax paid in each of the jurisdictions in which the multinationals operate. These data 
can subsequently be shared among tax authorities. In fact, the first actual exchanges 
took place in 2018. As of January 2020, 57 states have been exchanging CbC 
reports, while 90 jurisdictions have legislation in place to introduce a CbC report-
ing obligation. Summary data for a number of selected countries were published 
for the first time in 2020 by the OECD.8 The United States published consolidated 
data of country- by- country reports for the years 2016 and 2017.
Notwithstanding the intrinsic limitations of CbC reporting,9 these data are 
informative as they indicate that a large share of US multinationals’ profits are 
shifted to low- tax jurisdictions (e.g., Cayman Islands). For 2017, the data shows 
7See Cover Statement by the Inclusive Framework on the Reports on the Blueprints of Pillar One 
and Pillar Two.
8See Action 13 Country- by- Country Reporting.
9See Limitations of the CbC reporting.
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that out of USD 4.2 trillion in accumulated foreign profits of US multinationals 
subject to country by country reporting disclosure requirements, 3 trillion dollars 
are recorded in low tax jurisdictions. In 2017, just 11 low tax jurisdictions accounted 
for 56 percent of US MNE foreign profits.10 This shift resulted in a misalignment 
in the distribution of profits relative to economic activity (Desai et al., 2006).
4. policy pRoposals To ReFoRm The Tax sysTem
The relationship of tax avoidance by multinationals and the relationship to 
personal income inequality, the focus of this review article, begs for policy pro-
posals which Saez and Zucman (2019) provide. The issue of offshore tax evasion 
poses an enormous challenge to the efficacy of tax systems in curbing the degree 
of inequality (Alstadsæter et al., 2018, 2019; Dharmapala, 2008; Zucman, 2013, 
2014). Alstadsæter et al. (2019) show that offshore tax evasion is highly concen-
trated among the rich, indicating that official inequality estimates are potentially 
highly underestimated when not properly accounting for unreported assets. The 
proposals that we focus on are corporate- taxation specific; however we also briefly 
introduce the Saez and Sucman proposed reforms for personal taxation.
Two complementary solutions are proposed to limit tax competition between 
jurisdictions and ensure consistent global minimum taxation of corporate profits. 
The first solution is to introduce a global effective minimum corporate tax, which 
would ideally ensure that profits from multinationals are taxed at a minimum rate 
of 25 percent regardless of the location of the affiliate. According to Saez and 
Zucman (2019), if  G20 countries were to introduce such a rule, 90 percent of the 
world’s corporate profits would be effectively taxed at 25 percent or more, de facto 
curbing the global volume of profit shifting. The second complementary solution 
can be considered a defensive measure against multinationals headquartered in 
countries that refuse to cooperate and do not introduce the minimum tax rule. Any 
government implementing a global minimum corporate tax would also calculate 
the tax deficit of  multinationals, that is, the extra tax that a multinational would 
pay if  it were subject to an effective tax rate of 25 percent in each of the countries 
in which it operates (see Clausing et al., 2020 for details on the design of this solu-
tion). Any country implementing this defensive measure will then become a tax 
collector of last resort, which would ensure that the global minimum tax is upheld. 
Without this complementary defensive measure, multinationals’ inversion (i.e., 
switching corporate residency) would enable them to elude taxation, although US 
anti- inversion rules and the 2016 EU Anti- avoidance directive11 have made these 
inversions more costly.
The idea of a global minimum tax rate builds on the current US global intan-
gible low- taxed income (GILTI) rule,12 which applies a minimum tax of 10.5 per-
cent to US multi- nationals’ foreign affiliates’ income deriving from the exploitation 
of intangible assets. The proposal of the corporate minimum tax rate is similar to 
the proposal currently being negotiated within the G20- OECD Inclusive 
10See 5 Lessons on Profit Shifting From US Country- by- Country Data.
11See The Anti- Tax Avoidance Directive.
12See IRS and Treasury issue guidance related to global intangible low- taxed income (GILTI).
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Framework. However, Saez and Zucman (2019)’s proposal is much more compre-
hensive than the US GILTI rule and what is currently being negotiated by the G20- 
OECD. This is because their minimum tax proposal is intended to apply on all 
profits of overseas affiliates, on a country basis and with no carve- outs/exemp-
tions, as opposed to the US GILTI rule, which uses a global blending approach for 
determining profits subject to the minimum tax.
As regards personal taxation, Saez and Zucman (2019) propose to integrate 
corporate and individual taxes to make corporate tax shelters meaningless and 
curb the degree of personal income and wealth inequality. In this system, corpo-
rate taxation is only a prepayment for the individual income tax. Regarding tax 
rates, they envisage a top marginal tax rate of 75 percent on all income earned 
above the threshold of USD 500000, implying an average tax rate of 60 percent 
for the 1 percent richest Americans. To reach this target, the three necessary ele-
ments are: a progressive income tax, a corporate tax, and A progressive wealth tax 
(currently the only element not in place). The latter is considered by the authors 
as an important instrument to raise the overall degree of tax progressivity in the 
US, which cannot be attained by the income and corporate tax alone. In addition, 
Saez and Zucman (2019) advocate the introduction of a national income tax (a flat 
tax, with a single rate of 6 percent on both labor and capital incomes) to sustain 
large government expenditures, such as universal social insurance programs, health 
care and education for all. In his review of this book, Weber (2020) claims that 
the authors do not elucidate on the different effects of the national tax proposal, 
regarding its administration, legal challenges that could arise or potential behav-
ioral effects.
5. concluding RemaRks
This review article covers the literature on the multifaceted relationship 
between corporate income taxation and inequality in light of a set of debates 
opened by Saez and Zucman (2019). First, we analyzed the complex relation-
ship between corporate taxation and inequality, identifying both contributions 
that highlight the curbing effect of corporate tax on inequality, and those that 
claim that corporate taxation might paradoxically raise personal inequality. We 
proceeded by identifying the current practices of taxing multinational entities and 
potential alternatives under discussion, and we provided an overview of the latest 
estimates on the missing fiscal revenues of nations. Finally, we discussed the policy 
proposals put forward by Saez and Zucman (2019) to reform corporate taxation 
at the global level, namely, the introduction of a corporate minimum tax and its 
functioning.
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